Protecting Property from Stationary Bandits by Edgardo Barandiarán
626 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMIA (Vol. 40, Nº 121, diciembre 2003)
PROTECTING  PROPERTY  FROM  STATIONARY  BANDITS
EDGARDO BARANDIARÁN*
1. INSTITUTIONS AND PROSPERITY
The idea that “institutions matter” for understanding variations in the
economic performance and evolution of countries is increasingly supported by
empirical research. For example, Rodrik and others report estimates of  “…the
respective contributions of institutions, geography, and trade in determining income
levels around the world…” and they argue that the results “…indicate that the
quality of institutions ‘trumps’ everything else...” (2002: Abstract); and Acemoglu
and Johnson have found “…robust evidence that property rights institutions
have a major influence on long-run economic growth, investment, and financial
development…” (2003:p.39).
That idea has yet to lead to a theory of institutions, one that answers hard
questions: Why have societies evolved along distinct institutional trajectories?
How will societies that failed to adopt the institutions of more successful ones
respond to environmental changes? Will they converge to a global arrangement?
Will institutional diversity continue to evolve? Aoki (2001) has developed a
framework for addressing them. Building on Greif’s idea of an institution as
equilibrium strategies of the players of a game, Aoki relies on the theory of
evolutionary and repeated games to give the following notion of an institution:
An institution is a self-sustaining system of shared beliefs about how the
game is played. Its substance is a compressed representation of the salient,
invariant features of an equilibrium path, perceived by almost all the agents in
the domain as relevant to their own strategic choices. As such it governs the
strategic interactions of the agents in a self-enforcing manner and in turn is
reproduced by their actual choices in a continually changing environment.
(Aoki 2001:26 and 185).
In  Aoki’s framework, the relevant unit of analysis is the domain as composed
of a set of agents and sets of feasible actions open to each agent in successive
periods. First, he identifies what institutions can become viable in some basic
types of domains as defined by two dimensions: a fixed or a variable number of
agents, and the symmetry or asymmetry of the action sets across agents. Second,
he constructs a generic framework for comparative analysis that supports that
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notion of institutions and allows us to link games across different domains to give
rise to new forms of institutions and across time by introducing the agents’ revision
of their subjective game models as a mechanism of institutional change. Finally,
Aoki applies his framework to the analysis of corporate governance institutions in
different economies. He highlights the diversity of institutions, partly determined
by complementarities with institutions in other domains, and their evolution. He
concludes by arguing for the continuous evolution of diverse institutions, despite
forces to converge into one global arrangement.
Only other applications will tell whether Aoki’s approach is appropriate to
develop the idea that “institutions matter” into a theory.  One key application
relates to the state as a viable institution. Aoki suggests that the nation-state
emerges as a third-party mechanism for protecting property and enforcing contracts,
but the viability of any particular state is conditioned to resolving Weingast’s
fundamental political dilemma of protecting property from government. By
conceptualizing states as stable multiple equilibria of a game in the polity domain,
the government and the private agents can settle on a certain order between them
and to which the government itself is subject to. Thus, he distinguishes between
the state as an order and the government as an organization. He then analyzes
three prototype modes of the state as stable outcomes of a game in the polity
domain –the predatory, collusive and democratic states– which I propose to use
as a framework to assess the protection of property from stationary bandits, to use
Olson’s evocative term for autocracy (2000).
This paper outlines the application of Aoki’s framework to the analysis of
the protection of property. I look first at a basic setup in which an army may emerge
to protect property against plundering by foreigners, and then at how property
may be protected against extortion by the stationary bandit. To conclude, I point
out the relevance and some implications of the proposed analysis.
2. THE VIKINGS ARE COMING!
To understand the stationary bandit I look for a setup in which he could
have emerged as an institution. Thus, I look at the complementarities between the
equilibria of a commons game in the domain of customary property rights (Aoki,
2001: ch. 2) and the equilibria of a Vikings game in the conflict domain (not
considered by Aoki). Agents –villagers in one game and Vikings in the other– do
not strategically coordinate their choices across the two domains, but the choices
in one are parametrically affected by the choices in the other. According to Aoki’s
idea of institutional complementarity, it is possible that “one type of institution
rather than another becomes viable in one domain when a fitting institution is
present in another domain, and vice versa” (Aoki, 2001:225).
For generations villagers have been catching rabbits and playing the same
game to decide what amount each one can catch every season.  Assuming
incomplete information and applying Young’s evolutionary bargaining model
(1998:ch. 8), a stochastic process of catching over some time can lead to a
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convention about the division of a fixed number of rabbits (the number that can be
caught without depleting their capacity to reproduce) among the villagers. Thus,
a generically stable convention –one relatively most difficult to upset by mistakes
or experiments as it becomes infinitely more frequently observed than all others–
may be established implying a larger share of catches for less risk-averse villagers
with a higher level of information-gathering capacity. Its establishment amounts to
the emergence of a stable customary property-rights rule (Aoki, 2001:section 2.1),
a source of some spontaneous order.
Let the village be rich enough to be a lucrative object of plundering, and let
the Vikings be the roving bandits interested in plundering villages (on Vikings as
rational bandits, Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen, 2003).  Some Vikings may want
to settle down in the villages and become stationary bandits to extort the villagers.
Why and how do some roving Vikings become stationary bandits? Even if extortion
is much more profitable than plundering, it is not a sufficient condition and perhaps
not even necessary. For the roving Vikings, a village is like a common resource, so
they have to compete among themselves for plundering it and the competition
may lead to over-plundering. Among other factors, the technology of exclusion is
critical in order to explain the switch to stationary banditry: each Viking’s net
benefit from plundering depends on his ability to exclude his competitors. In some
situations, settling down in a village may be a cost-effective way to exclude all
others.  As the village’s “owner” the stationary bandit will find it in his own
interest to enforce a convention regulating rabbit-hunting as effectively as possible
and to extort villagers at the optimal rate in the Laffer’s curve (Grossman, 2001). By
fighting rivals to death or by colluding with them, some Vikings become stationary
bandits. The conflict among rival Vikings may end with a winning party or an
agreement to exploit a third party, or it may become never-ending (Skarpedas,
2003). In any case, both the dynamics and the eventual ending of the conflict have
implications for the villagers as interested third parties, to the point of questioning
the assumption of no strategic interaction among all interested parties.
The Vikings upset the village’s order. Let the village be rich enough to
consider a defense, so the threat of plundering triggers a demand for protection
that may lead to the rise of a new institution, the army.  Why may the army succeed
in some villages and fail in others? For the villagers, protection against plundering
by foreigners is a non-rival good and its production is subject to the logic of
collective action (not a rival good with the negative, deflection externality of
protecting property from theft; Anderson and Bandiera, 2003).  The analysis has to
consider two factors. First, the successful provision of protection depends on the
army’s ability to deter aggressors and defend the village from attacks, so the
village has to meet one of two conditions for its independence. It has to have the
ability to make aggression unaffordable or infeasible, or at least the ability to make
it undesirable by denying the aggressor the benefit of his action (McGuire, 2001).
The conditions are met only if the village’s wealth (measured by the surplus over
survival needs) is sizable enough to acquire the technology of defense relative to
the wealth and technology of potential aggressors. Failure to meet both conditions
leads to unions with other villages or to migration or to capitulation to the aggressors.
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In a world of distant villages, poor villages may realize that the benefit of union is
too low and the cost of migration too high, so accommodating the stationary
bandit is the best choice (leading perhaps to the jungle economy as defined by
Piccione and Rubinstein, 2003).
Second, even if the independence conditions are met, villagers can fail to
agree on establishing an army. Although the standard issues of collective action,
in particular free riding, may not be as decisive as in other non-rival goods, the rise
of the army poses a threat of extortion to villagers’ property and they must be
assured that they will be able to control it. This assurance means that the villagers
have the ability to make extortion unaffordable or infeasible or at least the ability to
deny the army the benefit of extortion, so their threat of coordinated resistance is
credible. The second amendment to the U.S. constitution provides such assurance:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. It is not easy to
determine the conditions for this and other mechanisms to be cost effective,
however. In particular, is a high degree of equality in the distribution of property
rights –most villagers have the right to catch the same number of rabbits– necessary
for the village to pay willingly to the army for its protection services and to prevent
extortion? In her analysis of the mafia, Bandiera (2002) provides evidence of a
positive relation between land fragmentation (a proxy for equal distribution of
property rights) and the mafia’s payoffs, but this is because of the negative
externality of protection from theft. Since protection against plundering is a non-
rival good, Olson’s collective-action predictions hold: if all players are identical,
they will not contribute to its provision; if they are not identical, the large may be
exploited by the small; and the larger the size of the group, the lower the incentives
to contribute (Sandler and Arce, 2002). Thus, since the need to control the army
reduces the benefit of the pure public good, it may exacerbate differences in the
net benefit of contributing to its provision between the large and the small, and an
army may be established only in villages where property is highly concentrated.
As long as the stable customary property-rights rule reflects differences in
the villagers’ abilities and preferences, the institutional arrangement is most likely
to evolve towards a property regime supported by an army when the village’s
income is high and property concentrated. Indeed, this arrangement can lead to
extortion of one group by another within the village, and analytically it does not
matter whether the stationary bandit is a villager or a foreigner.
3. TAMING THE VIKINGS
By definition, if the one with the greatest capacity for violence imposes his
rule over others, an order can emerge, one in which the ruler extorts the villagers.
This predatory state becomes self-enforcing if two conditions are met. First, villagers
fail to coordinate their resistance because the cost for each one to cooperate with
others is greater than the deadweight loss from extortion (Aoki, 2001:154). Second,
the ruler is able to commit credibly not to revert to plundering (say by “arming his
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subjects” as in Machiavelli’s advice, Azam, 2002). A stationary bandit—the
predatory state’s ruler—is better than roving bandits, but he has a hard time to
secure and extend his tenure, a main driving force of his actions. A ruler is limited
by rivals seeking rents, especially his impatient heirs and others close to him, and
the competition is likely to increase the deadweight loss for a given revenue from
extortion (Klick, 2002). Thus, the loss may eventually exceed the cost for some
people to resist extortion. Although the stationary bandit may block his rivals, the
predatory state is hardly robust enough to claim that it “…is reproduced by [all
agents'] actual choices in a continually changing environment”, as Aoki’s notion
of an institution requires. To check its robustness the analysis has to take account
of that rivalry and its related competition as well as the potential for resistance by
at least some villagers (Grossman, 2001).
Let me now assume that the villagers are divided into two groups of agents.
If one group realizes that the deadweight loss of extortion exceeds the cost of
resisting it, then the ruler will find it in his own interest to bribe this group to not
cooperate with the other villagers to resist extortion (Aoki , 2001:155). The stationary
bandit and a group may then agree on a ruling coalition to extort the other villagers,
and as long as the ruler is able to commit himself credibly not to cheat on his
partners, the collusive state can become self-enforcing. For this state to be robust,
in addition to Aoki’s conditions –one group loses the incentive to cooperate with
others because of the ruler’s bribe and the excluded villagers do not find it
worthwhile to cooperate and resist– the ruler must commit himself credibly not to
cheat on his partners. Indeed, the ruler’s ability to enter into this commitment is
related to the size of the minimum coalition to secure revenue from extortion.  The
collusive state implies a division of the village into a ruling coalition with power
–with the ability to impose costs on others– and the other villagers. The arrangement
resembles the predatory state: the ruler is committed not to revert to plundering by
assuring the support of some villagers with an interest in extorting but not
plundering other villagers. In other words, the ruler agrees to limit his power by
sharing it with the smallest number of villagers that may block his attempts to
revert to plundering, and as long as the parties believe the coalition has a high
probability of survival, the agreement will continue to be honored.
The collusive state can change in different directions. When the incumbent
ruling coalition reacts to environmental changes, neither a reversal to the predatory
state nor a continuous march toward a democratic state is the inevitable outcome.
Rivalry within the incumbent coalition can trigger changes in its leadership but
hardly lead to its breakdown. Shocks, that is, large environmental changes, may
create conditions for increasing the size of the coalition, but also for changing its
composition without any meaningful increase in size. Most breakdowns in the
ruling coalition are temporary, and when they happen, new coalitions take over.
Starting with the collusive state, a major shock may precipitate either an involution
toward the predatory state or an evolution toward the democratic state if threats of
resistance force a continuous enlargement of the ruling coalition to stop exclusion
(as in Gradstein, 2002; also Grossman, 2001). In particular, the pressure of population
growth and migration on natural resources may lead to resistance and perhaps to
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the enlargement of the ruling coalition. Albeit not an inevitable outcome, some
form of democratic state may emerge, implying the dilution and dispersion of the
revenue from extortion.
 It is tempting to argue that differences in some original setup of countries
–particularly in land distribution– explain differences in long-run performance.
The state has been evolving for a long time, however, and few countries (say
North) can claim to have contained the stationary bandit and to be democratic in
Aoki’s sense (or an agent of citizens, Grossman, 2001). Institutional explanations
of North’s success point to a consensual society where political order is based on
social cooperation: citizens agree on how government should be organized, and
they are willing both to live under the decisions made by such a government and
to defend government as an organization against abuse by political officials (D.
North and others, 2000). This remarkable degree of consensus is part of North’s
original setup and therefore is left unexplained (Grossman, 2001). To become a self-
sustaining system of shared beliefs as in Aoki’s notion of an institution, such
consensus should have developed pari passu with the enlargement of the ruling
coalition, but its study assumes an understanding of temporal and cross-sectional
linkages of institutions that Aoki’s framework is now starting to discover (2001:ch.
10; see also Greif, 1998).
4. NORTH VS. SOUTH
My short story about the Vikings’ role in triggering new institutions of
property is intended to illustrate the relevance of  Aoki’s game-theoretic frame-
work for institutional analysis. Recent contributions provide many insights to
revise how the institutional arrangements of nation states and property have been
changing in parallel, albeit with diverse forms across countries. Together they
provide a different angle to understanding the issues facing countries where new
generations of Vikings are yet to be tamed.
If  “institutions matter”, differences in prosperity across countries can be
explained by differences in their institutions. In my story, the differences between
countries that have contained the stationary bandit (North) and those that have
yet to do it (South) are not rooted in the original setup from which property and
nation states emerged, but in the responses to environmental changes over long
periods of time. A shock may bring the collapse of the old regime but does not
determine the new institutional arrangement. Some views on the differences between
North and South conclude that fixing the latter’s institutions—to be like North’s in
some original setup—is necessary for prosperity. In my story, it is not a question
of transplanting North’s institutions, but of how a system of shared beliefs—as in
Aoki’s notion of an institution—emerges in support of removing barriers to the
enlargement of the ruling coalition.
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